Individual rights and the democratic boundary problem by Cabrera, Angel
 
 
Individual rights and the democratic boundary
problem
Cabrera, Angel
DOI:
10.1017/S1752971914000037
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Cabrera, A 2014, 'Individual rights and the democratic boundary problem', International Theory, vol. 6, no. 02,
pp. 224-254. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971914000037
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Cambridge University Press 2014
Eligibility for repository: checked October 2014
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
International Theory
http://journals.cambridge.org/INT
Additional services for International Theory:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Individual rights and the democratic boundary
problem
Luis Cabrera
International Theory / Volume 6 / Issue 02 / July 2014, pp 224 - 254
DOI: 10.1017/S1752971914000037, Published online: 20 June 2014
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1752971914000037
How to cite this article:
Luis Cabrera (2014). Individual rights and the democratic boundary problem .
International Theory, 6, pp 224-254 doi:10.1017/S1752971914000037
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/INT, IP address: 147.188.224.226 on 13 Oct 2014
International Theory (2014), 6:2, 224–254 © Cambridge University Press, 2014
doi:10.1017/S1752971914000037
Individual rights and the democratic
boundary problem
LU I S CABRERA
Reader in Political Theory, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of
Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
E-mail: a.l.cabrera@bham.ac.uk
How should the geographic boundaries of democratic participation be set?
This has been a notoriously difﬁcult theoretical question, beset by paradoxes
around determining democratic participants democratically. It also is seen as
increasingly important in practical terms, amid deepening interdependence between
states, immigration tensions, and suprastate regional integration. Numerous recent
accounts have called for extending participation beyond the state. The case is generally
made on intrinsic grounds: democracy demands it. Respect for individual autonomy is
said to be violated when outsiders are deeply affected by decision processes, or subject
to coercion from them, without being able to participate in them. Yet, familiar
problems around restrictions on the autonomy of persistent democratic minorities
remain in such accounts, and they could be magniﬁed with expanded boundaries.
An alternative approach is offered here, grounded in a rights-based instrumental
justiﬁcation for democracy. It sees participation as foundationally – though not
solely – valuable as a means of promoting and protecting fundamental rights.
It recommends extending participation boundaries to reinforce protections
within regional and ultimately global institutions. Democratic participation
would remain crucial at all levels, not principally as an expression of autonomy
but to provide checks on power and promote accountability to individuals in
multilevel polities.
Keywords: global democracy; boundary problem; democratic paradox;
cosmopolitan; individual rights; all affected
When it comes to the European Union, it's up to member states of the
European Union to decide.
–Nicolas Sarkozy, Prague, April 2009 (Vogel 2009)
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Introduction
The quotation here1 from former French President Sarkozy highlights the
continuing and, many would argue, increasing importance of democratic
boundary problems.His claimwas offered in response to a call byUS President
Barack Obama for Turkey’s full accession to the European Union. Accession
would mean the extension of formal EU citizenship to Turks, and voting and
representation rights in the European Parliament, among other entitlements.
Sarkozy’s response expresses what could be called the ‘common sense’ view
about how geographic2 participation boundaries should be set. According to
this view, those who already have the status of participatory insiders should
be the ones to decide which outsiders will be admitted to that status. This
obtains whether the would-be participants are citizens of an accession-
candidate state in a regional integration project, prospective immigrants, or
some other set of persons offering claims for inclusion.
Some democratic theorists have argued similarly that geographic participa-
tion boundaries simply should be accepted as found, in part given complica-
tions likely in extending them (see Schumpeter 1950, 243–45; Whelan 1983,
40–42; Dahl 1989, 119–31; Dworkin 2011, 382). Others have argued for
preserving existing rights to exclude from participation on more positive
grounds. These ‘associative democracy’ accounts (see Marchetti 2012, 27)
focus on relations or virtues that are said to arise or be possible to promote
only in the domestic democratic sphere (Christiano 2006b, 74; Ypi 2012,
Ch. 6; see Song 2012). Numerous others, however, have sought in recent years
to problematize the restriction of democracy to existing geographic boundaries.
The most prominent or inﬂuential such accounts recommend participatory
1 This article has had a long gestation, and I have incurred many debts in developing it. For
thoughtful written comments, I thank Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Laura Valentini, Katherine
Tonkiss, Ashok Acharya, Christopher Finlay, Kirstie McClure, Jamie Mayerfeld, Jethro Butler,
Richard North, and the editors and anonymous reviewers for this journal. I also received very
useful feedback from audiences at the Workshop on Cosmopolitanism and Global Institutions,
Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands; the Workshop on Global Political Justice,
Monash University Prato Centre, Italy; the Ethics and Public Affairs Seminar of CIDE in Mexico
City, seminars hosted by the political science departments of the universities of Delhi, Cardiff,
Shefﬁeld and Birmingham; and at the 2012 annual meeting of the International Studies Asso-
ciation in San Diego, California. Any errors remaining are my own.
2 The focus in this article is on extending territorial political boundaries, primarily through
embedding states in suprastate regions and regions in an evolving global institutional system.
Other accounts would extend participation more selectively, for example, according to an indi-
vidual or domestic group’s stake in a speciﬁc trans-border issue (Macdonald 2008; see also
Bohman 2007). Thus, the more encompassing term geographic boundaries is used here. I will
note also that non-geographic participation boundaries or exclusions remain highly salient in
various polities, including ones based in age, citizenship, gender, religion, mental capacities (see
López-Guerra 2012).
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expansion, up to the global level, according to an intrinsic approach to
democracy. In such an approach, democratic procedures are seen as intrinsi-
cally satisfying some signiﬁcant moral requirement. In the two main ‘global
intrinsic’ approaches to be considered here, the moral imperative is respect for
individual autonomy. It is said to be shown inadequate respect:
a) when individuals are clearly affected by a collective decision but cannot
participate in the decision process (Held 1995, 2004; see Linklater 1998;
Archibugi 2008; Marchetti 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Cavallero 2009; Koenig-
Archibugi 2012; see also Goodin 2007; Macdonald 2008; Agné 2010),
b) or when they are actually or potentially subjected to coercion arising from
collective decisions in which they cannot participate (Abizadeh 2008, 2010,
2012; Fraser 2008, 64–67; see Smith 2008; Näsström 2011).
These will be called, respectively, the all affected and all subjected
approaches to democratic boundary setting. Both focus on perceived mis-
matches between decision makers and decision takers, or restrictions of
autonomy without accompanying participation rights. Both also see such
mismatches as frequently occurring beyond state boundaries in the current
system. Thus they advocate geographic participatory expansion.
I argue that outward is indeed the right direction for participation
boundaries. The two predominant global intrinsic approaches, however, do
not ultimately give us decisive reasons to expand participation. This is
primarily because they cannot show that participation actually would
enable autonomy for persistent democratic minorities. The problem of
protections for suchminorities – those whomay perpetually ﬁnd themselves
on the losing side of majority decisions – is a familiar one in democratic
theory, and it could in fact be magniﬁed and multiplied were intrinsic
approaches to guide democratic expansion beyond the state. Advocated
here is an alternative, ‘rights-based instrumental’ approach to justifying
democracy and ultimately setting geographic participation boundaries.
Like the global intrinsic approaches, it would see some restrictions on
democratic participation as objectionable. Unlike in those accounts, the
objections would arise primarily from the crucial role such participation
can play, along with closely related mechanisms of transparency, account-
ability and legal challenge, in ensuring the reliable protection of a more
comprehensive set of individual rights for all persons in a polity.
Such protective considerations also should lead us to advocate boundary
expansion. That is, because of biases and other inward-looking dynamics
naturally reinforced by a sovereign states system, it is likely that the creation
of broader supranational polities would be required to reinforce and
ultimately ensure many of the requisite rights protections. Thus, the
appropriate response to problems identiﬁed in the intrinsic global democracy
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approaches is not to recommend a retreat to state boundaries, but to pursue
geographic participatory expansion as feasible in service of enhancing
rights protections (pace Song 2012). In a case such as Turkey’s, for example,
full accession would be advocated as a means of strengthening rights protec-
tions, once the candidate state had, with appropriate assistance, achieved
benchmarks for economic stability and the rule of law. The recommendation
would not be simply to include Turks as participants in collective decision
making about their own inclusion, aswould be the case in some global intrinsic
accounts (see Agné 2010). In the longer term and in the fully global context,
the rights-based instrumental approach can inform a more appropriately
rights-centered expansion of democratic political community, meaning one in
which comprehensive rights are constitutionalized at a relatively high thresh-
old, and where majority governing power at all levels is subject to a range of
rights-based accountability challenges.
The argument is developed in three sections. The ﬁrst section outlines the
predominant global intrinsic approaches and details some challenges to them.
The second section develops the rights-based instrumental approach, and the
third deals with some possible objections to it. I offer reasons to think that
the objections can be satisfactorily answered, and thus that a rights-based
instrumental approach appropriately grounds democratic rule and informs
the operation and geographic expansion of participation boundaries.
Intrinsic democratic expansion arguments
Democracy will be understood as comprising at minimum a process of
collective decision making among persons who have formally equal
standing to participate. I will focus on collective rule within formal political
institutions, or ‘institutionally established procedures that regulate
competition for control over political authority’ (Føllesdal 2011, 100).
Thus, I do not consider accounts focused on participatory collective action
by groups in international civil society, or on strengthening trans-state
deliberation and publicity but not necessarily developing corresponding
trans-state institutions (see Scholte 2012). Such accounts are signiﬁcant, in
particular for highlighting some further means of promoting accountability
in the global system. The primary concern here, however, is with claims
around formal participatory channels, including possible imperatives to
create or further democratize institutions at the regional and global levels.
Within such an understanding of democratic rule, an intrinsic justiﬁca-
tion for it is one focused on some innate quality of democratic procedures
which is seen as legitimating the decisions they produce (see Christiano
2006a). That quality could, for example, be an appropriate embodiment of
fairness for individuals who share a certain kind of communal context
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(Christiano 2006b), or an appropriate expression of moral equality more
broadly construed (see Buchanan 2004, 252–54; Anderson 2009, 214).
Alternately, democracy could be seen as intrinsically justiﬁed by ways in
which it enacts or embodies reciprocity within shared institutions under
conditions of ineliminable diversity (Waldron 1999). In an intrinsic
account, the legitimacy of enforcing any particular decision is closely bound
up with the perceived democratic quality of the decision procedure. If the
procedure appropriately embodies the moral requirement, then the legiti-
macy of decision outcomes is seen as effectively established, or at least
presumptively very strong (see Bellamy 2007).
The intrinsic moral requirement most commonly cited, including again in
the two leading global intrinsic approaches considered here (see Held 2004,
170; Abizadeh 2008, 39–40), is respect for individual autonomy. Collective
self-rule is seen largely as an extension of individual autonomy or self-rule,
where individuals collectively author the laws under which they will live.
As Arash Abizadeh puts it, ‘The democratic ideal of collective self-rule
is grounded in the notion that securing the conditions of individuals’ autonomy
and standing as equals intrinsically requires that they be the joint authors of the
terms governing the political power to which they are subject’ (2012, 12). The
next sections examine how the two approaches see such a joint authorship
requirement leading to the expansion of participation beyond the state.
All actually and possibly affected interests
The ﬁrst, ‘all actually affected’ approach emphasizes the effects that
globalization and global economic integration can have on autonomy,
as well as other vital interests. This approach is closely associated with
such cosmopolitan democrats as David Held (1995, 2004) and Daniele
Archibugi (2008),3 and it has generated a broad literature in the past two
decades (see Smith and Brassett 2008; Schaffer 2012). In the approach,
decision effects on participatory outsiders are seen as having greatly
expanded and intensiﬁed in recent years. This is said to be a result of
increased interdependence between states and thus higher cross-boundary
sensitivity to decisions (Koenig-Archibugi 2012), an increasing proportion
of trade and other rules being decided beyond direct democratic oversight,
at the suprastate level; and increasing effects on domestic polities from
decisions made by trans-state ﬁrms and other economic actors (Held 2004,
Ch. 6; Archibugi 2008; Marchetti 2008a, 2008b; Falk and Strauss 2011;
see Gould 2004, 210–16; Pogge 2008, 190–92). Each is cited as reason to
3 Archibugi’s emphasis on autonomy or individual agency is not as explicit as Held’s, but his
account, which emphasizes popular control and political equality, is consistent with it (2008,
26–30).
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extend democratic decision boundaries, in service of enabling appropriate
participation and democratic control.
Practical proposals for expansion include the further development of
regional parliamentary bodies and the creation of a global parliament. The
latter is often conceived as a directly elected second chamber operating
alongside the United Nations General Assembly (Held 2004, Ch. 6;
Archibugi 2008; Marchetti 2008a, 2008b). Its powers would be necessarily
limited at ﬁrst, but they would be expected to increase over time, ultimately
to include signiﬁcant ability to bind through legislation. At the horizontal,
state-to-state level, proposals include one by Koenig-Archibugi to set a
GDP-based formula for a percentage of a state’s domestic representatives to
be elected by outsiders. He estimates it should be about 27% in the US case,
based on its economic power and impacts beyond its borders (Koenig-
Archibugi 2012, 463, fn. 19).
Such all actually affected accounts can offer important insights, in
particular for the challenges they pose to some common claims for
restricting participation to the domestic sphere (Dahl 1989, 119–31). As a
comprehensive approach to setting participation boundaries, however, all
actually affected will face some signiﬁcant objections. The ﬁrst concerns a
paradox faced by intrinsic accounts generally. Within such accounts, the
people are understood to be the ultimate source of political power. It is their
collective will which ultimately legitimates coercively backed decisions – an
intrinsic requirement of their being empowered to lead appropriately
autonomous, self-chosen lives. Yet, the question of who ‘the people’
actually are in that polity cannot be decided democratically. As many recent
commentators have discussed, current members cannot simply be asked to
collectively choose whether they are the rightfully conﬁgured people,
because that would presume that they already are the people for the pur-
poses of such decisions, and so on to inﬁnite regress (Yack 2001; Goodin
2007; Näsström 2007, 2011; Abizadeh 2008, 2012, 8; Miller 2009; Zurn
2010; Schaffer 2012, 327–28; see Whelan 1983; Song 2012). This regress
problem has crucial implications. If the people cannot be the ones to
determine who properly belongs to the sovereign people, then nor can they
clearly be seen as the ultimate source of decision-making authority in an
intrinsic approach. Questions will remain about whose autonomy it is
appropriate to enable through participation, and these cannot be settled
merely through declaring that boundaries should be accepted as found (see
Näsström 2007, 625–26).4
4 Näsström notes similarities between such a declaration and claims that any form of gov-
erning power, however objectionable, must be accepted as found, given that it also emerged from
some historical process.
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All actually affected rejects such a declaration and seeks to dramatically
expand the set of participants. This will not, however, address the paradox.
Consider that decision effects will depend in large part on the geographic
boundaries drawn around the body making the initial decisions. That is,
the set of those affected by decisions, and therefore presumed to be appro-
priately included in subsequent decisions, is conditioned by the size, compo-
sition, interests and other factors speciﬁc to the set of initial decision makers.
Yet, the boundaries around the initial decision makers are taken as found.
Thus, the original paradox has not been addressed. It has not been determined
who properly belongs to the initial decision making set, or who properly has
participation rights in existing intergovernmental institutions above the state.
This extension or reinforcement of the paradox is cited by such com-
mentators as Robert Goodin as one reason to problematize existing
boundaries even further, and adopt an ‘all possibly affected’ intrinsic
approach. Since conceivably any person could be affected in the salient
ways, depending on the initial decision boundaries, on who is setting the
agenda, and on the decisions actually issuing from it, all would appear to
have standing to be included in all decision making processes (Goodin 2007,
55). Two important challenges remain, however. First, we can note that,
because agendas are to remain so open in the all possibly affected variant, it
cannot be determined in advance whether any conceivable decision would
have strong implications for autonomy, or whether it would more generally
affect the most urgent interests or the most trivial interests of any set of indi-
viduals. Nor would it be possible to determine who would be most deeply
affected by any particular decision. Any possible agenda, and any decision
arising from it, could affect any person, and possibly very deeply (seeMarchetti
2008a, 2008b, 91, fn. 20; Miller 2009, 216–17). Thus, the approach may not
be able to give much practical guidance in setting participation boundaries.5
Second, there is an implicit but more essential challenge to the all possibly
affected approach, around whether extending the franchise to individuals
actually will express the intrinsic value intended. All affected accounts in
general would expand participation as a means of showing adequate
respect for individual autonomy – or in Goodin’s speciﬁc account,
5 Koenig-Archibugi (2011) argues that in practice agendas need not be so open, since polities
have widely varying powers to affect the interests of others. Yet even very small states’ decisions
can have deep impacts on outsiders, e.g., negative impacts associated with illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows to
small-state tax havens (see Reuter 2012). Koenig-Archibugi suggests also that it could be
appropriate to limit some decisions through accountability mechanisms after the fact, rather than
assuming that all possibly affected should be included. To be equitably applied, however, such
limits would need to be formalized in binding, constitution-like documents. That would imply a
starting point in rights-based limits on decision effects, rather than intrinsic requirements to
enable autonomy through participation.
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autonomy and other vital interests. Simply expanding the set of those
possessing the franchise, however, or who are entitled to membership in
agenda-setting bodies, does not ensure that autonomy will be enabled or
protected. Those who found themselves in a persistent voting minority
could see their own aims routinely thwarted in the democratic process,
however equal their ability to participate in it (Beitz 1989, 155–63;
Dworkin 2000, Ch. 4; Caney 2005, 155; see Christiano 2006b, 103;
cf. Agné 2010; Song 2012, 45).6 This problem could again be magniﬁed
with a global extension of participatory institutions. It can be asked, for
example, how far being granted representation in some democratic global
assembly would protect or enable the autonomy of those in very small states
facing speciﬁc common threats, such as climate change-induced rises in sea
level (cf. Agné 2010). Being granted participation rights, only to then be
routinely outvoted, would seem to do little for actually enabling autonomy,
on which more below.
All possibly subjected
This second global-intrinsic approach would reject an emphasis on decision
effects, in part from concerns that affect may give a person some standing to
claim redress for harms but not actual participatory standing (Abizadeh
2012, 12; see Beckman 2009, 46–47; see also López-Guerra 2005, 222–-
24). Instead, the emphasis here is on ensuring appropriate participation for
those who are actually or potentially subjected to political coercion, meaning
‘direct physical force, invigilation via agents authorized to used physical force,
and threats of punitive harm’ (Abizadeh 2012, 12). Such a coercion emphasis
is longstanding in the literature on domestic democracy (see Dahl 1989,
124–26). In its global extension, in particular Abizadeh’s (2008, 2010, 2012)
highly systematic elaboration in a series of complementary arguments, the
same logic is applied to authoritative coercion which crosses state boundaries.
All who stand to be coerced should be enabled to participate.
Abizadeh’s starting point is the democratic paradox: the problem noted
above with determining democratic participation boundaries through
democratic participation. He sees this as strong reason to view the demo-
cratic polity as in principle unbounded in an intrinsic approach. All
should simply be presumed to be part of the polity. Thus, any coercion
which may serve to restrict autonomy, including that used to set and
maintain state boundaries, must be justiﬁed to all who are subject to it
6 Song, who rejects boundary expansion, argues that all persons should be enabled to have
fully ‘equal opportunities for political inﬂuence’ (2012, 45) within existing states. If those
opportunities simply resulted in the persistent denial of minority interests, however, they could
count for little in substantive terms.
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(Abizadeh 2008, 44–48, 2012). Following Raz, (1986, 372–78), Abizadeh
sees autonomy as obtaining when an individual: ‘(1) has the appropriate
mental capacities to formulate personal projects and pursue them,
(2) enjoys an adequate range of valuable options, and (3) is independent,
that is, free from subjection to the will of another through coercion or
manipulation’ (2008, 39–40). Signiﬁcantly, he sees potential subjection to
coercion as omnipresent in the current global system. Any person, for
example, could conceivably choose to enter any country and face coercive
exclusion from it. Thus, a democratic process is required to render any
exclusions – and the ensuing restrictions of autonomy – legitimate, and that
process could extend to the fully global level.
I will bracket concerns about whether border controls are coercive per se
(see Miller 2010; cf. Abizadeh 2010). More essential here is whether coer-
cion and the restriction of autonomy are the factors actually driving parti-
cipatory inclusion in the account, and ultimately whether the problem of
persistent minorities has been overcome. In terms of inclusion, Abizadeh
would give ‘a greater participatory say to foreigners for whom entry actu-
ally represents a valuable option, an even greater say to those for whom the
option of entry is necessary to have an adequate range of valuable options,
and perhaps the greatest say to citizens themselves’ (2008, 58). This
approach to inclusion would thus be consistent with the Razian under-
standing of autonomy, which again emphasizes valuable life options and
the ability to make use of them.
Yet, any strong emphasis on the last claim, that current citizens should
have the most say over their own borders, would seem at odds with the core
tenets of all possibly subjected. If current citizens are given the greatest
decision input, presumably because of the greater actual coercion to which
they are subject, then that would simply ignore the democratic paradox.
Present state-backed coercion to which citizens are subjected is a result of
their membership in the state. It cannot be cited as conclusive proof that they
were appropriately counted as members – and others excluded from mem-
bership – in the ﬁrst place. As noted for the all actually affected approach
above, the extent of affect or coercion on individuals would be deeply con-
ditioned by already existing boundaries. If the point of the exercise is to
determine where boundaries should be set, then effects arising from existing
boundaries cannot independently tell us whether those are indeed the
boundaries that should have been set or should now be maintained.
If, as is more consistent with the overall approach, an emphasis on actual
present coercion is rejected, then the starting point again is a polity that is
unbounded in principle, where all persons are understood to be equally
potentially subject to coercion. The fact of that potential coercion would
qualify all for the possibility of participatory inclusion, or more precisely,
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inclusion in collective decisions about who is to be included (Abizadeh
2008, 64, fn. 46, 2010, 2012). So, in practice, inclusion should be deter-
mined by how valuable it is to promoting individuals’ autonomy, in parti-
cular those for whom ‘the option entry is necessary to have an adequate
range of valuable options’ (Abizadeh 2008, 58). If that is the case, then
several steps have been taken in the direction of an instrumental approach.
Participatory inclusion will be dictated by how needy the potential entrants
are, and how far their inclusion is necessary to addressing their needs. It will
not be decided by how far it would enable participation per se; or by
whether the entrants are being subjected to actual coercion, the extent and
intensity of which again will be conditioned by existing polities’ boundaries
and characteristics.
That said, the explicit presumption remains in Abizadeh’s and other
coercion-focused accounts (Agné 2010) that inclusion will not mean
addressing such deprivations directly, but permitting would-be entrants to
participate in decisions about who should be included in the polity. Here,
the problem of persistent minorities recurs. If the needy were included in
collective-entry decisions only to ﬁnd themselves routinely the losers on
such decisions, then little would have been done to address the deprivations
which gave them the initial priority for inclusion. Abizadeh does not want
to simply afﬁrm such an outcome, or the exclusion of persistent minorities
more generally. He posits a fundamentally deliberative democracy, in
which ‘those subject to political power must be able to see their political
institutions and laws as the outcome of their own free and reasoned public
deliberation as equals’ (Abizadeh 2008, 41). Deliberation, of course, is
important to democratic governance for many reasons. Here, however, we
can simply note that individuals’ deliberatively informed preferences must
at some point be aggregated. Given the likely intensity of the preferences at
stake for those in afﬂuent receiving countries, it is not unlikely that the
outcomes would be the same as in some non-deliberative process. The
persistent minority of needy hopeful entrants could continually see them-
selves outvoted and excluded, however formally equal their standing in the
decision-making set, and however valuable the option of full inclusion
could be to them.
Alternately, if we imagine that somehow vast numbers of persons are
seeking to enter some very small, very rich state and vote to open its borders
immediately, the result being that its governing capacities are overwhelmed,
the minority problem could be reversed. If prior steps are taken to avoid this
outcome, then the account will again have moved beyond an intrinsic
approach, to one like the rights-based instrumental approach which begins
with limits on majority rule. The broader point would be that, even on their
own terms, intrinsic accounts focused on enabling individual autonomy
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face a core problem of coherence. If binding majority rule plausibly leads to
an expression of autonomy as self-governing for the winners, it always also
raises the possibility of enforcing heteronomy on persistent losers. As
Christiano expresses it, in such accounts, ‘If each person must freely choose
the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are
not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others.
So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision’
(2006a).7
Given that consensus can be expected for few if any collective decisions, all
decisions will bind some losers. If they are persistent losers, perpetually
excluded from substantive legislative beneﬁts in a polity dominated by men,
or a speciﬁc race, caste, religion, etc., this offers a serious challenge to the idea
of democracy as self-legislation, or more broadly as enabling individuals to
lead autonomous, self-chosen lives (Bohman 2007, 6–8; see Arneson 2009).
The same challenge would obtain at the global level, and probably with
greater force, given a greater potential range of persistent minorities.8 Thus,
the global intrinsic accounts’ claims to offer a coherent justiﬁcation for
democratic rule, and also for democratic expansion, are cast into doubt.
A rights-based instrumental alternative
Let us then consider some more fundamentally instrumental accounts of
democracy. Such accounts can be placed into three general categories:
strategic, epistemic, and character focused (see Christiano 2006a). Strategic
accounts see democracy as instrumental to helping individuals protect
themselves from harm, and enabling them to make effective demands for
important economic and social goods (Buchanan 2004, 142–47; Caney
2005, Ch. 5; Talbott 2005; see Sen 1999b, 152–53). A Republican strategic
variant would focus in part on the instrumental importance of democracy
for protecting individuals against domination, or the arbitrary exercise of
7 Christiano argues separately (2006b, 89–90) that an account focused on the equal
advancement of individual interests will set intrinsic, not instrumental, limits on democracy
(2006b, 99). It is not clear, however, whether he is genuinely offering an intrinsic account, given
that a polity is said to surrender rights against external interference when its ‘assembly engages in
widespread and persistent violations of democratic, liberal and economic rights’ (Christiano
2006b, 100). This would set prior conditions on shared rule based in a fairly comprehensive
conception of individual rights.
8 Marchetti (2008b, 159), makes the valuable point that global democracy would give
domestic minority groups the opportunity to join forces above their states and press collectively
for change. At the same time, it can be acknowledged that implementing any form of major-
itarianism for a global polity of multiple billions would stand to create many more persistent
electoral minorities. Thus, the autonomy/coherence issue would remain.
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power over them (Bohman 2007; see Lovett 2013). Epistemic instrumental
accounts are focused on ways in which broad participation and other
characteristics of democracy can lead to better decision making than other
forms of rule (Estlund 2008; see also Arneson 2003). Character focused
accounts highlight democracy’s potentially beneﬁcial effects on the char-
acter of the populace itself, speciﬁcally in promoting a willingness to stand
up for oneself, and promoting respect for others as co-equal citizen parti-
cipants (Mill 1861, Ch. 3; see Kateb 1992, Ch. 1).
The account offered here is informed by insights from each of the three
categories but is focused on the ﬁrst, strategic one. It begins with an emphasis
on the importance of vital human interests. These are understood to include
familiar interests in avoiding premature death, unchosen physical harm,
having adequate nourishment and access to medical care, as well as being
able to exercise agency and to avoid subjection to unjust discrimination
(Buchanan 2004, 25–26, 134–35; see Raz 1986, 166; Caney 2005, 72–77;
Talbott 2005). These interests are considered essential enough to human
well-being that they give rise to speciﬁc protective rights. Just how extensive
the package of rights should be, andwhether the account should lead to some
version of trans-state equality of opportunity based in rights against unjust
discrimination (Caney 2007b; see also Buchanan 2010), cannot be pursued
here, though there is nothing in what follows that would rule out the latter.
I presume that rights against unjust discrimination, enacted as various forms
of legal and political rights to directly challenge salient decisions, will be
necessary in a range of cases to individuals being able to effectively protect
their vital interests. Further, it is highly likely that, in the pursuit of integra-
tion between states described below, rights against unjust discrimination
would be interpreted to eventually include rights for individuals to pursue
opportunities through crossing political boundaries, broadly analogous to
the free movement regime in the current European Union. Thus, there is no
presumption that protections can or must be constitutionalized at only at the
level of ‘basic rights’, especially in the longer term.
In this approach, rights are understood as most effectively protected
within appropriately conﬁgured political institutions. In the immediate
term, this means an emphasis on rights-respecting democratic states,
though suprastate institutions, in particular the European Union, have
increasingly important roles to play. The core importance of such political
institutions, as opposed to other kinds of coercive agents, is that by design
they are generally the ones best able to
1) reliably provide comprehensive rights coverage for individuals, and
2) routinely obtain compliance from individuals with duties to contribute to
rights protections and to avoid violating rights.
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Neither coverage nor compliance can ever be complete, of course. Gaps in
both inevitably will emerge, regardless of how well-resourced or well-
meaning the governing apparatus is within a set of institutions. Thus, in
this approach, speciﬁc civil and political rights are seen as crucial instru-
ments to be used in publicizing and protecting against violations of more
comprehensive rights corresponding to vital interests (Christiano 2011; see
also Sen 1999, Ch. 6; Buchanan 2004, 142–47; Talbott 2005, Ch. 7; Caney
2005, Ch. 5; Føllesdal 2011). Such procedures would include voting to
select representatives and possibly some forms of referendum voting, but
also publicity and accountability mechanisms associated with consolidated
liberal democracies, for example, legally actionable rights to freedom of
speech and press, peaceable assembly and protest, and some legal rights to
directly challenge laws, rules or decisions. In such an institutional context,
individuals are enabled to appropriately challenge political power holders
through forms of protest and expression, and to chasten them through
formal electoral processes and, signiﬁcantly, in courts or through ombuds
processes (see also Kateb 1992, Ch. 1). Both kinds of mechanisms are
crucial for achieving and sustaining rights protections, and they are major
factors in explaining why stronger protections are found in consolidated
liberal democracies than in hierarchical regimes (Christiano 2011, 149–51;
see Davenport and Armstrong 2004).
Yet, however consolidated a democracy, the presumption is that such
procedures and mechanisms of accountability will never be eliminable in
practical terms (see Mayerfeld 2011; cf. White 2010). This is the case for
both strategic and epistemic reasons.9 In the case of the latter, even if some
cadre of wise and neutral judges, or perhaps Platonic Guardians (Dahl
1989, Ch. 4; see Estlund 2008, 206–22), were put in place across a set of
institutions, and they were fully empowered and genuinely committed to
securing the core rights of all individuals in their jurisdiction, they still
could not be all-knowing. It would remain important for those within
the polity to be able to share with even some maximally benevolent despot
their own ‘insider’s wisdom’ (Shapiro 2003, 39–43) about how speciﬁc
proposals or decisions could affect them. Likewise in strategic terms, it is
presumed that the power to challenge and chasten governing power must
always be available to the polity if governors are to remain appropriately
sensitive to the interests and rights of the governed. This would rule out
some scheme of ‘governing with judges’ or other leaders who could not be
held accountable for their decisions. Finally, there is a strong presumption
in the rights-based instrumental approach that any one of the named
9 I thank two peer reviewers for pressing me on this point.
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mechanisms of accountability, while arguably necessary to ensuring the
requisite rights protections, will not in itself be sufﬁcient. Thus, the
approach should not be taken to recommend simple enfranchisement, for
example, as a sufﬁcient protective tool. Persistent minorities could again
ﬁnd themselves with very limited protections. It is not possible to state here
with precision which set of accountability tools will clearly be necessary
and sufﬁcient, but it is presumed that the more mechanisms available to
challenge and chasten governing power, the better able individuals will be
able to protect their own rights.
Two ﬁnal points should be noted about the nature of the rights-based
instrumental account developed here. First, it does not claim that there is a
clear human right to democracy on instrumental grounds (see Bohman
2007, 38). Unlike in intrinsic accounts, where autonomy or other core
human attributes are said to require democracy, it is presumed logically
possible here that some non-democratic regime could achieve the appro-
priate standards on all rights protections. Such a regime would be highly
unlikely to emerge in practice, however, and even if it could, its protections
would be fragile and continually tested, given the information problems
noted above and the lack of publicity, challenge and other mechanisms.
Second, while this account is primarily instrumental, it is not fundamentally
consequentialist. The claim is not that democracy is choiceworthy because
it is the system of rule that will tend to produce maximum aggregate
welfare, etc. (see Arneson 2003; cf. Buck 2012). It is conceivable, at least,
that some majoritarian procedure which suppressed core rights for a
small, persistent minority could create more utility for the polity overall.
Here, democratic procedures are viewed as instrumentally valuable in the
protection and promotion of individual rights, where protective procedures
are consistent with respecting the rights of all individuals.
Thresholds and rights chains
In practical terms then, the rights-based instrumental approach would
recommend a relatively high threshold of constitutionalized individual
rights, including again some robust rights to non-discrimination. It is not
possible here to set some precise threshold for which rights, or which
interpretations of speciﬁc rights, should be so viewed as falling below the
threshold and outside the limits of collective decision making. Two things
can be said, however. The ﬁrst is to reinforce again the importance of
insider’s wisdom or insight, speciﬁcally in setting thresholds for speciﬁc
rights, or enabling individuals to highlight ways in which agendas
and possible decisions from them may have unforeseen implications for
weakening rights protections. Democratic deliberation, augmented by
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mechanisms to ensure the inclusion of the poor and others whose voices are
often muted in public dialogue, certainly would have a role to play in
publicizing the insights of all persons in a polity regarding the identiﬁcation,
provision and appropriate interpretations of rights protections.
The second regards the signiﬁcance of rights chains. That is, even the
most fundamental rights likely will require legally actionable secondary and
tertiary rights to be adequately secured. A right to life, for example, likely
will entail a right to adequate housing, meaning housing that provides
protection from the elements, animals or insects and diseases they bear, easy
predation by other persons, etc. That in turn entails a right to secure legal
tenure in housing, which implies rights, or at least entails a need for,
appropriately empowered – and appropriately restrained – police and legal
bodies capable of enforcing those rights, and so on. It cannot be claimed
that rights to housing are strictly necessary to a right to life, given that it is
clearly possible to live out of doors and survive, as millions of homeless
persons around the world do (see Pogge 2009). It would be more difﬁcult,
however, to argue that such persons are adequately protected from stan-
dard, generalizable threats to vital interests, especially exposure to elements
and predation. Thus, the adequate protection of even the most fundamental
rights will require the creation of institutions capable of enacting and pro-
tecting secondary, tertiary and quaternary rights directly linked to the core
right (Caney 2007a, 154–63; Nickel 2007, 87–90).
Overall, such rights chain logic provides an important counter to claims
that constitutionalized rights represent little more than the opinions of some
about objective value (Waldron 1999, 164–87; Zurn 2010, 211–13; see
Agné 2010, 388). Constitutional protection of the rights entailed in the
chain is strongly implied, and they are to some extent off the decision table.
In general, the balance would be tipped to protections, and those would be
expected to become more ﬁrm the closer to vital interests any speciﬁc issue
is located. Many areas of collective decision making, of course, are not so
clearly related to core rights and would appropriately remain above the
threshold. Democratic procedures here could be justiﬁed by epistemic or
character-based instrumental reasons, possibly complemented by some
intrinsic reasons (see Dworkin 2011, 390–91). Thus, the rights-based
instrumental approach is fundamentally focused on rights protections,
but not solely. It would, however, be vital to ensure that rights-based
challenges could be heard to claims that a speciﬁc issue is above the
threshold and is appropriately choice sensitive.10 A partial model is
10 Many such challenges likely would involve ‘new’ rights claims, or claims on behalf of
groups such as gays and lesbians who had previously been presumed appropriately excluded
from some anti-discrimination legislation (see Johnson 2013).
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provided at the regional level by individuals’ direct standing to ﬁle challenges
in the European Court of Human Rights,11 and on a more narrow range of
issues, including some pertaining to rights against unjust discrimination, in
the European Court of Justice.
Integration and rights protections
How, then, does this rights-based instrumental account give guidance
on democratic inclusion, speciﬁcally on the core question of where the
geographic boundaries of participatory rule should be set? The account,
in fact, should give us strong reason to pursue the creation of broader
institutional and participatory boundaries. Such extension would be crucial
for meeting the two aims noted above, of reliably providing rights coverage
for individuals, and reliably obtaining compliance with duties related to
rights protections.
We can note ﬁrst a presumption that, in a rights-based approach, duties
to help secure universal individual rights for all persons will in principle fall
on all other persons. This is similar to Abizadeh’s claim above that, within
an autonomy-based intrinsic approach, the democratic paradox gives
reason to view the polity as, in principle, unbounded. The presumption in a
rights-based approach is consonant with a well-known argument by John
Simmons (1979, 143–56). He argues that an account focusing on rights and
corresponding natural duties – understood as duties to others based in their
plain humanity – will face an unavoidable ‘particularity problem’. It will
not be possible to demonstrate why any particular attention should be paid
to protecting the rights of domestic co-participants, or any other set of
persons smaller than the global, if it is indeed individuals’ plain humanity
which gives them standing in a rights framework.
I take this not as a problem so much as a description of the natural
starting point for geographic boundary setting within a rights-based
instrumental approach. Advocates of such an approach who wish to limit it
to the domestic or perhaps regional sphere must identify reasons why the
duties corresponding to rights held by all persons do not fall on all persons.
So, for example, Estlund would claim that present state boundaries should
be presumed to set the limits of participation in an instrumental frame,
because they represent the ‘effective and available means of securing the
discharge of duties’, including ones of rescue to those in need, and fair share
duties to sustain common institutions (2008, 148). There are reasons to
11 The Court did not evolve as a formal European Union institution, however, Article 6 of the
EU’s 2009 Lisbon Treaty mandated its accession to the European Convention on Human Rights,
meaning that EU legislation would become subject to direct challenge in the Court (Lock 2010).
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think, however that such duties, and the rights corresponding to them, will
be routinely underfulﬁlled in a system of competitive, ‘separate but equal’
sovereign states, and thus that institutional and participation boundaries
should be extended where feasible.
These reasons are traceable primarily to a set of interconnected biases,
naturally arising in a states system. The biases serve as powerful forces
working against distributions not only of resources and opportunities to
outsiders, but also against extending fully fair terms of trade and invest-
ment, equitable aid conditionalities, responsibilities to address climate
change and other threats. Biases include an electoral or stakeholder one,
where domestic leaders have strong incentives to tend to the interests
of their own constituents ﬁrst and routinely ignore those of outsiders.
Self-interest and a more subtle own-case bias arise at the level of the
collective or polity. Polities are left to be the judges of their own obligations
in a global system lacking a neutral suprastate judge or forum where salient
decisions can be challenged from outside the states taking them. Thus, they
face few systematic challenges to acting from plain self-interest, and in fact
tendencies to do so are reinforced by accompanying tendencies to presume
that one’s own case is right when one is left to judge it – a dynamic explored
by Locke ([1690] 1980, 12), among others (Mayerfeld 1998; Buchanan
2004, 293–99).
These and other biases against fully recognizing and accommodating the
interests of non-compatriots are inherent to a system in which states remain
the ultimate judges in their own cases. They represent continuous barriers
especially to obtaining full compliance with duties to ensure adequate rights
protections to all persons (Cabrera 2010, Chs 2–3; see also Caney 2005,
159–64; Pogge 2008, Ch. 7; Mayerfeld 2011).12 Thus, there are strong,
rights-based reasons to expand institutional and participatory boundaries,
bringing more persons within institutions capable of providing appropriate
rights coverage and obtaining compliance with duties corresponding to
rights. Whether these reasons might be trumped by some other moral
claims is taken up in third section below.
Possible institutional expansions
The institutional implication is decidedly not that we are left with a stark,
dichotomous choice between accepting the existing states system and
creating some all-powerful global government, as commentators such as
12 In Cabrera (2010, Chs 2–3) I offer a more detailed treatment of such duties, as well as of the
biases and possible reasons to expand institutions, though without the emphasis on democratic
participation boundaries.
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Risse (2012, Ch. 16) would suggest. Familiar concerns around a Kantian
‘soulless despotism’, global instability and possible tyranny (see Song 2012)
surely would attend such a set of global institutions, were they somehow to
be imposed in the near term and state boundaries simply erased from the
map. Rather, a rights-based instrumental approach gives reason to promote
the progressive expansion of participatory political institutions, as feasible
and within the limits of respect for individual rights.
The ultimate aim would be a system of institutions in which adequate
coverage and compliance would obtain for all. Thus, as with global
intrinsic accounts, especially those in the all actually affected camp, the
ultimate institutional aim would be relatively strongly empowered regional
and global democratic political institutions capable of enacting appropriate
binding legislation on states and sub-state units. Signiﬁcantly more emphasis,
however, would be placed in the rights-based account on the more compre-
hensive package of constitutionalized rights. Held, for example, would argue
for the constitutionalization of only those individual rights that are directly
related to enabling democratic participation (1995, 190–201). This springs
in part from his intrinsic justiﬁcation: respect for autonomy demands
democracy, and democratic participation demands certain enabling rights.
The rights-based account would consider a wider range of rights, including
again non-discrimination and related free movement rights. It would stress
the importance of making such rights actionable in multiple layers and types
of courts, as well as enabling other accountability mechanisms.
In the relatively near term, there would be some signiﬁcant possibilities
for mitigating biases through the creation of democratic supranational
institutions. The European Union represents a partial exemplar – only
partial because of its incomplete democratization. That is, while individuals
within states can vote for individual Ministers of the European Parliament
representing geographic districts within member states, there is no directly
elected EU president, and the interests of individual member-state govern-
ments continue to hold powerful sway in EU institutions overall, especially
in terms of policy agendas (see Føllesdal and Hix 2006). Individual
democratic participants have relatively limited opportunities to share their
insider’s insight and otherwise engage in potentially signiﬁcant political
communication at the suprastate level. That said, the EU does provide
a range of accountability mechanisms that can serve to reinforce rights
protections, and it gives individuals direct opportunities to lodge legal
challenges on some key rights issues. It also represents an invaluable living
laboratory for studying opportunities for, and challenges to, shared rule
above the state.
The rights-based approach would support full EU accession for Turkey
on grounds that it would be highly likely to strengthen rights protections,
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including economic rights related to free movement opportunities and
enhanced distributional transfers across borders, as well as some social
rights and rights to free expression.13 Such support would be contingent on
any candidate state meeting some rights-salient institutional and feasibility
conditions, discussed below. As noted, however, the recommendation
would not be that Turks simply be included in a collective decision proce-
dure on their own inclusion (Agné 2010). That could do little more than
give them persistent minority status, as with the needy would-be migrants
above. Likewise, the rights-based alternative would recommend the dee-
pening and political transformation of other regional entities such as
Mercosur, the North American Free Trade Agreement and African Union,
were that to be plausibly rights enhancing. There also would be, over time,
some obligations on the part of those in richer suprastate regions to support
the development of institutions in poorer ones, lest the ‘separate but
equal’ states system be transformed into a similarly unequal system of
have and have-not sets of regional institutions. That concern, with the
presumption that the biases could be replicated at a higher level in such a
world of regions, would give reason to pursue integration between regions
where possible.
Finally, if deep political integration were indeed possible between states
and regions over the long term, then the creation of fully global political
institutions, including a global parliamentary body, would be advocated as
important to further protecting and sustaining rights, though again a more
comprehensive set of rights than the global intrinsic authors generally
envision. In the near term, an important implication of a rights based
approach is that the development of global democratic bodies may not be
the most urgent item on the agenda. If rights protections were better served
through strengthening state capacities, further developing and consolidat-
ing regional human rights courts or the International Criminal Court,
and reforming and enhancing United Nations oversight of individual
states, then such reforms would have priority. Unlike in a global intrinsic
approach, there would be no in-built moral requirement to pursue
participation per se above the state. Rights reforms would not, however,
represent an appropriate stopping point, given the potential instrumental
importance of such participation. There would be strong reason to pursue
the creation of suprastate democratic institutions over time, including at
the global level.
13 Turkey’s summer 2013 protests, which began in Istanbul but soon spread to cities
nationwide, were in part focused on claimed rights against the imposition of some religious mores
on public life, and more generally were concerned with a perceived refusal by the ruling AKP
Party to consider any insiders’ insights but its own (see Arango 2013).
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Possible objections
I will focus here on three types of objections to extending participation
boundaries according to a rights-based instrumental approach. The ﬁrst
sees national belonging as a more appropriate means of setting boundaries,
the second holds that features of a shared political life justify a restriction of
participation to existing boundaries, and the third that perverse con-
sequences would be entailed by an instrumental approach.
National sentiment
This objection holds both that shared national sentiment is a necessary
condition of participatory rule, and that it provides the most appropriate
basis for setting participation boundaries. The ﬁrst, necessity claim
(Miller 1995, Ch. 4; see also Song 2012),14 has been challenged by
numerous commentators (Føllesdal 2010; Weinstock 2010; Koenig-
Archibugi 2011, 527), and it will not be pursued in detail. A more central
concern is with whether a national sentiment approach, or any related
approach focused on drawing participatory boundary lines around persons
who share some set of characteristics (Miller 2009), can overcome the
democratic paradox.
There would in fact be myriad difﬁculties in identifying traits – language,
religion, culture, historical emphases – that are shared sufﬁciently exclusively
among a group of persons to justify rigid exclusions from participation
(Abizadeh 2012, 2–5). The traits would not be self-evidently unique to one
group of persons. Judgments would have to be made about who appro-
priately belongs to the group. This would obtain even were the ultimate
polity to be an ethnocracy composed along straightforwardly ethnic or racial
lines. For example, what would be appropriate inclusion for those of mixed
parentage? Do they qualify for membership at half blood, one-quarter, or at
‘one drop?’15 Who decides who is qualiﬁed to decide on insiders and out-
siders? Who decides on those deciders, and so on? If we move away from
ethnocracy, as David Miller (2009), Michael Walzer (1983) and virtually all
14 Song (2012) would limit shared rule to the domestic sphere in part on grounds that only it
can provide the necessary solidarity and stability. Yet, states range in population from 10,000 to
more than 1 billion, often with vast internal diversity of language and culture, rendering any
straightforward such claims problematic.
15 The phrase ‘one drop’ refers to US exclusion mandates for persons with African-American
ancestry. In the landmark 1896 Supreme Court case of Plessy vs. Ferguson, defendant Homer
Plessy was deemed to fall under Louisiana’s segregation laws because of his 1/8 black ancestry.
Today, various ‘blood quantum’ standards continue to play a role in determining membership in
Native American tribes, though there is no uniform rule for qualifying percentage of ancestry
across all tribes (see Villazor 2008).
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recent defenders of solidarist boundary drawing have sought to do, then the
challenges are multiplied many times over. Inﬁnite regress would seem to
obtain especially when a broader set of ascriptive characteristics, none of
which is presumed to be strictly necessary, is to be used to try to delineate
participatory insiders from outsiders (see also Agné 2010, 385–86).
Associative accounts
What, then, about accounts which focus not on ascriptive cultural or ethnic
characteristics, but on shared associative ones? Ypi, for example, argues
that appropriately conﬁgured domestic democratic contexts should be
preserved for ways in which they promote civic education and could
inculcate moral cosmopolitan values (2012, Ch. 6). For Christiano, the
domestic sphere is a morally distinctive common world where the interests
of individuals are extensively intertwined through their joint and compre-
hensive subjection to law and institutional regulation (2006b, 85, 100–1,
2012, 74). Given this deep interdependence, he argues, those who share a
state can be said to have a ‘roughly equal stake’ in decisions it makes,
and thus to have a strong claim to a democratic say. Existing suprastate
institutions do not create such common worlds, however, and thus there is
no strong imperative to extend democratic boundaries.
Arguably this objection, which is most directly salient to global intrinsic
approaches, could be directed at the rights-based instrumental approach.
Some such features of associative life, that is, might justify giving strong
priority in participation and overall rights protections to compatriots.
Mathias Risse, for example, argues against extending strong principles of
distributive justice globally, given that individuals who share a state are
collectively subject to comprehensive coercion and engaged in deep forms
of reciprocity (2012, 36–40; see also Nagel 2005). Similar reasons might be
offered against a strong imperative to extend institutional participation
boundaries on rights-based instrumental grounds.
In response, it can be noted ﬁrst that there is nothing inherent in
associative arguments to prevent the gradual development of suprastate
institutions capable of providing a common world, etc., as Christiano
(2006b, 83) acknowledges. It could be claimed that the European Union,
with its vast set of uniform laws, large-scale redistribution via ‘cohesion
funding’ (European Commission 2013), and its increasingly signiﬁcant
and directly elected parliament, already has traveled some distance
toward the creation of a common world. For the same reasons, it might be
appropriately seen as an institutional site of distributive justice, and a
potentially very signiﬁcant site for the strengthening of comprehensive
rights protections through integration, as described above.
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More crucially here, there is a potential tautology at the heart of asso-
ciative claims for the restriction of participation or principles of distributive
justice to the domestic sphere. This is similar to the problem noted above, of
extending boundaries based on decision effects, but without ﬁrst justifying
the boundaries that condition those effects. Associative accounts emphasize
virtues produced in a democratic domestic sphere, as well as facts of
reciprocity, joint coercion and interdependence in that sphere. Such current
facts, however, do not necessarily justify past and continuing exclusions
from participation or distributions. It must ﬁrst be demonstrated that the
setting and maintenance of particular boundaries, and the exclusions from
membership and collective goods that such boundaries entail, was and is
morally defensible (see also Buchanan 2004, 35–37; Caney 2008).
I will focus on facts of coercion and reciprocity. We can note again that
many claims about the moral signiﬁcance of state-backed coercion or
comprehensive regulation are, at root, claims about restrictions on autonomy.
Individuals are coerced; they live under extensive schedules of laws,
institutional rules and regulations, and this is said to contribute to their
standing to participate or to receive robust, justice-based distributions. Yet,
associative accounts also make a clear distinction between authoritative
state coercion and plain oppression. The latter is seen as a straightforward
wrong. The former is to be employed in service of ensuring domestic
stability, the production of key social goods and overall effective and fair
institutions. Coercion is, in fact, an intrinsic feature of such institutions,
without which they could not provide the beneﬁcial goods sought. If this is
so, however, the case for treating participatory standing or distributive
priority as due compensation for limitations of autonomy is signiﬁcantly
weakened. Submitting to state coercion would be, rather, a step toward
securing goods that all are presumed to need (see Pevnick 2008, 401–2).
It could not so easily be held up to would-be members as proof that insiders
have earned their exclusive privileges through seeing their autonomy
restricted, making sacriﬁces, etc.
In terms of reciprocity, the claim is that insiders have sacriﬁced not to
the state but for one another. The intuitions here can be strong: one good
turn deserves another. It is indefensible to take from others without
ultimately giving something in return. It can be noted, however, that many
compatriots do not engage in actual cooperation at the levels implied.
They may be handicapped, deeply economically disadvantaged, or just
ideologically disinclined to participate, and thus their actual contributions
may be minimal. Further, an emphasis on reciprocity within a given set of
persons cannot independently justify exclusions from that set. It cannot
demonstrate that that system within which the reciprocity and exclusions
have arisen is itself defensible.
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Likewise, citing the cooperation and reciprocity that can exist between
compatriots cannot itself speak to the defensibility of the broader global
system in which states are embedded (see Tan 2004, 28–29, 66–67). Given
that billions of persons continue to face severe poverty in that system, and
to see their core rights precariously protected at best (UnitedNations 2013),
any strong claim that its defensibility has been established will face steep
challenges. Thus, unless we can be certain that the initial move to exclude is
defensible, a moral shadow is cast over subsequent claims that exclusions
are just when grounded in current coercion, reciprocity, or civic virtues.
Ultimately, such claims would seem to do little but restate the paradox in
the frame of domestic associations: those who already are included, coerced
or stakeholders are the ones who should be empowered to determine who
should be so included, coerced or seen as a stakeholder, because they are the
ones already included, etc. It does not in itself justify refusing outsiders the
opportunity to enjoy the same beneﬁts through placing themselves within
the same framework of coercion and regulation.
This is not to suggest that we must adopt some form of stringent
ﬁrst-person impartiality, where any special consideration shown to parents,
children or other intimates must be justiﬁed according to a universal
morality.16 Nor does it recommend immediately throwing open the gates of
all states – a move that even ﬁrm advocates of freer immigration would
reject (see Seglow 2005). Rather, it challenges claims for exclusions based
only in present societal relations. By themselves, such relations do not
appear to justify the exclusions from participation or broader institutional
protections that are the norm in the current system. Nor would they appear
to justify strong claims to territorial rights or rights of occupancy, such
as those posited by Anna Stilz (2009). She argues that those whose
current residency is integral to their goals and personal relationships, and
who have not themselves committed wrongful acts to take up residence,
hold ﬁrm rights of occupancy and related rights to exclude. Yet, each
of these conditions could obtain for the children of a generation which
invaded the territory, or which committed some form of ethnic cleansing
to claim it (Miller 2012, 255–56). The defensibility of the current occu-
pancy cannot be settled without taking such acts into account. Likewise,
the exclusions from participation and institutionally backed rights
protections must be justiﬁed against the background of the broader
normative questions (see also Shachar 2009). The importance of enabling
individuals to help protect their own rights, and the biases noted above
16 Even in those spheres, however, intimacy does not trump all ethical concerns, as evinced by
laws against nepotism in public procurement, among others (see Gutman 2012).
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which contribute to rights underfulﬁllment, would constitute strong
reasons to challenge claims to full territorial exclusion rights.
Finally, we can note the broader challenge implied to any strong claims
for state sovereignty or self-determination. The latter claims in particular
are rooted in notions of popular sovereignty, or the autonomous choices of
a discrete, cohesive, self-legislating people (see Beitz 2009; Goodhart and
Taninchev 2011). Yet, we cannot simply say that each sovereign, demo-
cratic people should be left to determine its own fate if we cannot say with
conﬁdence that existing participation boundaries are appropriately drawn.
A rights-based instrumental approach would not give strong emphasis
to collective self-determination claims in general. It would again presume
that all persons are the people, in principle. It would seek to expand
participation according to that principle and in service of rights protections,
while it also would be cognizant of political constraints and the many
related challenges to expansion in the near term.
Neo-colonialism and sovereignty
If territorial rights, along with presumed self-determination rights, are to be
so open to challenge, does this lead a rights-based approach to perverse
consequences? For example, would it dictate the imposition of some neo-
colonial rule on states or regions where rights protections are precarious?
Justiﬁcations of that kind were common enough in 19th century and earlier
colonialism or imperialistic control. European powers often cited their
‘civilizing mission’ to assume care for the bodies and souls of persons
in scores of less afﬂuent or less powerful countries (Kohn 2012). Yet, any
re-imposition of such governing forms would be at odds with some of the
fundamental assumptions in the rights-based approach. First, there is little
reason to believe that those within a state that is suddenly subjected to
colonial or imperial rule would be afforded adequate opportunities to
participate. Even if the form of control were intended to be more benign,
though still presumably not fully participatory, acute problems would
arise around opportunities to share insider’s insight and, in general,
opportunities to chasten and challenge in order to protect their own rights
(see Sen 1999, 328–29, fn. 7.)
Further, any such wholesale imposition would seem likely to generate a
potentially violent backlash, with important implications for weakening
existing rights protections. It could simply set the stage for ongoing
civil unrest. Finally, a neo-colonial intervention by another state would be
problematic in part because of the biases noted above. Such a state acting
singly would not represent the sort of neutral judge presumed necessary to
overcome the biases. We can consider here the issue of humanitarian
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intervention, which raises some of the same concerns. There is strong
reason to believe that general decisions on intervention are not best left to a
single state. In fact, the creation of a more neutral and more disinterested
judge than the current UN Security Council likely would be a crucial step
toward more defensible outcomes, given the self-interested inﬂuence often
wielded by the ﬁve permanent members (Brock 2006).
Important questions remain, however, around the powers to chasten and
challenge that current citizens of regional projects should be able to exercise
on questions of integration. In the Turkish case, for example, we can ask
whether those within current EU member states should have referendum
powers to decide on accession. Former French President Jacques Chirac
(1995–2007) had, in fact, backed an amendment to the French Constitution
requiring a public referendum on the accession of any candidate state
whose population was 5% ormore of the total EU population – a guarantee
that French voters would have a direct say on Turkey. That amendment
was dropped, with Sarkozy’s support, in 2008, over concerns that it
could hamper the accession of other candidate states (Euractiv 2008). At
present, approval is required for accession from the European Commission,
which negotiates with potential members toward ensuring they meet the
Cophenhagen Criteria, benchmarks for democratic governance, economic
stability and rights protections. When the criteria are deemed satisﬁed
and negotiations concluded, the accession must still be approved by the
European Parliament and each existing member state, though in many
states the mechanism does not involve a direct popular vote.
As should by now be apparent, a rights-based instrumental approach
would raise concerns about empowering individual state governments or
their citizens to act as the ﬁnal judges in their own cases about obligations to
expand participatory and institutional boundaries. Such an expansion in
the Turkish case stands to enhance vital economic, social and civil rights for
millions of persons. In this case, the course recommended would be one
where obligations to help protect such rights are foregrounded, and where a
range of actors could share their insider’s insight during the accession and
negotiation process, but where the ﬁnal decision would hinge on a neutral
assessment of progress on the benchmarks, rather than a simple majoritarian
process. Again, that does not mean that economic feasibility, ‘accession
fatigue’ or other practical challenges such as Turkey’s strained relations with
Cyprus should be blithely ignored or will easily be overcome. Rather, it
highlights the course of action that would be prescribed within a rights-based
instrumental approach, as well as a position that would be important to
advocate in continuing practical dialogue on accession procedures.
What, then, of consulting those living within the accession candidate
state? This seems more challenging. If there is little expressed support in
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polls, etc., for accession, then the spectre of neo-colonialism could again
arise, of dominion imposed through unwanted inclusion. On the other
hand, a persistent minority – say the ~14 million Kurds in Turkey – as well
as the impoverished and otherwise excluded in that state, could beneﬁt
greatly from the access to resources and life opportunities, as well as the
democratic consolidation and civil rights enhancements, that full accession
could bring.17 I will suggest that, the stronger the expressed public oppo-
sition to accession, the greater the danger of weakening rather than
strengthening overall protections through accession, at least in the near
term. The rights-based instrumental approach would not recommend
integration again if it were likely to dramatically weaken rights protections.
It would recommend the extension of some free movement opportunities to
those in the candidate state, as well as a continuation of pre-accession aid,
especially that aimed at enhancing rights protections. Both types of mea-
sures would go some way toward addressing concerns around persistent
internal minorities, while reasons in favor of accession could be highlighted
in continuing formal dialogue.
Conclusion
I have offered a primarily instrumental, rights-based answer to the question
of how the geographic boundaries of democratic participation should
be set. It would avoid some of the problems identiﬁed with approaches
which build from intrinsic justiﬁcations for democracy, especially problems
around persistent minorities. An instrumental, rights-based approach
would emphasize the importance of constitutionalizing a relatively com-
prehensive schedule of signiﬁcant individual rights, and it would seek to
progressively extend geographic institutional and participation boundaries
in order to strengthen rights protections.
As suggested above, many practical questions would remain around the
actual expansion of participatory boundaries. In some cases, such as
Turkish accession, a clear route to inclusion can be identiﬁed, and there is
extensive dialogue and research on challenges to formal inclusion. In other
cases, including the possible expansion of participatory governance in the
North American Free Trade Agreement area (see Pastor 2011), a route to
formal inclusion is less clear, and practical challenges appear more daunting
in the near term. Even there, however, a rights-based approach can
17 Support for accession expressed by Turks overall has dropped in recent surveys. That
follows, however, years of stalled negotiations over Turkish relations with Cyprus, and amid
French and German opposition. Many commentators suggest that much stronger support for
accession would return were it to appear to be a viable prospect (see Bürgin 2012).
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fundamentally inform immigration reforms and other policy areas relevant
to boundaries. It offers a challenge that must be addressed by those advo-
cating rigidly exclusionary immigration and citizenship policies in the
domestic frame, as well as a set of principles capable of providing guidance
for the development of more appropriately inclusionary policies over time,
including ultimately at the global level.
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